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Abstract 
From the passage of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965 until the summer of 2013, several 
states were required to submit all electoral policies for preclearance, usually received by the 
Attorney General. This practice was codified by Section 5 of the VRA and targeted states and 
localities that had a history of discriminatory and restrictive electoral policies directed at 
limiting the influence of language and racial minorities. After the Supreme Court’s 2013 
decision in Shelby County v. Holder, some formerly covered jurisdictions responded to their 
newfound freedom from preclearance by implementing restrictive policies. The controversial 
Court decision and subsequent spate of potentially discriminatory election policies have raised 
questions about the past and future efficacy of the VRA and Section 5. Guided by the debate over 
the relevance of the VRA, this Paper examines the policy history of ten states formerly covered 
by Section 5, as well as recent developments from similar states that were never covered, 
Documenting each policy objected to by the Attorney General provides a framework to examine 
which states were the biggest offenders and what methods they employed in their attempts to 
limit minority voting influence. Using the previous half-century of data as a basis for 
understanding contemporary policy developments, this Paper finds that preclearance remains an 
important tool in combatting restrictive policies, at least in some specific states and localities. 
Moreover, this historical analysis paired with an overview of recent state behavior informs 
current and future discussions about a revised version of preclearance coverage. 
 
Balancing Rights: States’ Interaction with the Voting Rights Act 
In June 2013, the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision regarding the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 (VRA), an integral piece of federal legislation rooted in the Civil Rights Movement. 
The bill, which guaranteed equal access to the polls and nondiscriminatory election policies, 
immediately resulted in greater African-American participation and representation in politics. 
However, the recent Supreme Court decision on Shelby County v. Holder held that part of the 
VRA was no longer an acceptable tool for ensuring equality in the electoral process. Claiming 
that the “extraordinary measures” taken by the VRA to combat voting discrimination were 
constitutionally unfounded because of its “disparate treatment of the States,” Chief Justice John 
Roberts argued the majority opinion of the narrow, 5-4 vote.1 This nuanced decision effectively 
gutted the chief regulatory power of the VRA, striking down Section 4b of the law, which 
included the coverage formula to determine which jurisdictions qualified for federal preclearance 
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regarding any new election policies or procedures as ensured by Section 5. With states and 
localities no longer subject to preclearance, the VRA was diminished to primarily a reactive 
rather than proactive role in combatting discriminatory election policies. 
What has been the policy history of states and localities with respect to their Section 5 
coverage under the VRA? In this study, I compile and evaluate election policies from the states 
formerly covered by Section 5 of the VRA, which necessitated federal preclearance for all state 
election policy. Additionally, I compare their recent policymaking behavior to their 
demographically and ideologically similar neighbors, which were never subject to Section 5 and 
therefore provide a look at how theoretically similar states have operated without an identical 
history of election policy regulation. The election policies passed by the ten state sample and 
subsequently objected to by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) are evaluated with 
respect to when they were enacted, the level of government at which they originated, and the 
category of electoral restriction they fall into. Comparing this codified history with policy 
patterns of the four states never covered by Section 5 provides insight into the successes and 
shortcomings of the VRA. Using DOJ records, a National Conference of State Legislatures 
database, and reports on recent state developments, I include each relevant restrictive policy to 
shape a policy narrative and analysis of the diverse ways that state, county, and city lawmakers 
have interacted with the VRA throughout its history. With these data, conclusions can be drawn 
about when states and local governments were most active in enacting restrictive policies, as 
well as what factors may influence variation in their individual policy profile.  
 Given the unequal implementation of Section 5 of the VRA throughout its history, its 
effective repeal by the Supreme Court and the subsequent state election policies enacted can also 
be an opportunity to judge the status of the tricky balance between states’ rights and racial 
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equality in voting. Comparing these results to demographically similar states that were not 
covered by Section 5 helps to set a benchmark for the expected outcomes of state election policy 
free from federal preclearance during these periods. Examining the level of Attorney General 
objections to election laws passed in different states or at different periods exposes the 
consistency, or lack thereof, of federal efforts to abolish electorally restrictive policies. 
Understanding the experiences of similar states helps contextualize the extent of the legislative 
reach held by Section 5 covered states and localities. Finally, a preliminary verdict can be 
reached about the continued relevance of the VRA. This analysis finds that certain protections 
and regulations of the Act are still necessary to carry out the Act’s intent, and avenues to 
reinstate some form of preclearance must be fervently pursued. 
 Since 1965, states that were fully covered by Section 4b of the VRA, due to their history 
of voting discrimination, had to wait for federal preclearance before any policy affecting 
elections and voting could be enacted. Needless to say, the governors, state legislatures, and 
citizens of these nine, mostly southern states were frustrated with the process, as it delayed 
legislation and infringed upon state autonomy. Expansion of the VRA in 1982 to include any 
legislation that resulted in a discriminatory outcome, whether or not it was intended, fueled the 
resentment of the covered states. Over the nearly five decades of the Act’s existence, these states 
were limited in what legislation was allowable, but this dynamic came to an abrupt halt after the 
2013 Supreme Court decision. In response, many states that were previously subject to 
preclearance passed election policies, some of which mirrored legislation that was originally 
denied. This quick step to action was at least in part an affirmation of state and local policy 
preferences in election policy decision-making, and the laws have carried considerable 
ramifications. 
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 Writing as the representative for the dissenting faction of the Supreme Court decision, 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg questioned the logic behind the repeal, asserting, “history repeats 
itself,” due to the regression in federal protection of racial equality.2 Is she correct in this 
evaluation of the consequences of giving state and local governments freer reign in policy 
decisions, though? Scholars questioned the future necessity of the VRA in light of the progress 
that it had made, wondering if the Act had run its course,3 or was even a victim of its own 
success.4 These works and other explored the idea that the VRA developed into an imperfect 
solution for an ongoing issue. Speculation as to the longevity of the Act in anticipation of its 
2006 renewal was fueled both by the advancement of African-American and other minority 
groups in political influence, and by the growing impetus placed on passing specific, 
controversial policies by many of the states covered by the VRA. While the scholarship was in 
relative agreement that the VRA had been effective in its core goal of leveling the electoral 
playing field, the dilemma of continuing to enforce the Act at the expense of state autonomy was 
unsettled. Stemming from the concept of states as federally “conquered provinces,”5 the notion 
of regulation has been inexorably connected to the VRA, especially because the preclearance 
provision only applies to certain states and localities. 
 Entering a new era devoid of the VRA’s strongest regulatory control, there is no better 
time to research the fallout of such a momentous Supreme Court decision. While the issue of 
electoral participation across race and ethnicity is foremost in the ultimate judging of the VRA’s 
success, approaching this unique dynamic from a state and local lawmaking perspective helps 
tease out the struggles involved with forming and enforcing election policies. Building on prior 
research, my goal in this paper is to describe the policy arc of covered states and localities, while 
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informing the current Congressional discussion on the future of the VRA and the question of 
preclearance. 
The level of state autonomy in election policy was once contingent on its Section 5 status 
under the VRA. Uncovered states were able to immediately install new policies, while covered 
states had to wait months or longer in order to navigate the necessary steps to achieve 
preclearance. If the VRA had truly reached its primary goals, the initial policies enacted after the 
2013 Supreme Court decision should not have been any more electorally restrictive than other 
policies that were allowed through during between 1965 and 2013, since states would 
theoretically be reformed through fifty years of oversight. Despite the absence of a clear formula 
for determining preclearance, the immediate response of newly autonomous states passing 
restrictive legislation indicates that voting problems continue to be found through the 
transgressions of state and local policies.  
Examining this issue puts two constitutional protections in opposition. Traditionally, the 
right of states to administer their own elections and set election law has been protected under the 
reservation of powers in the Tenth Amendment. However, the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly 
grants Congress the power to act in order to protect the right to vote regardless of race. The 
VRA, and especially the preclearance provision in Section 5, is an instance where the Fifteenth 
Amendment is necessarily enforced through a narrower reading of the Tenth Amendment. Pitting 
the merits of these two amendments against one another, this paper explores the nature of state 
and local restrictive election policies and their interplay with the VRA throughout the last half-
century. Until the transition can be made to a period in which only Section 2 of the VRA (no 
preclearance) is needed without compromising equality of voting, it is clear that some form of 
federal preclearance remains sensible and necessary, at least in some specific cases. 
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Voting Rights Act: Enabling or Restrictive? 
Given the sweeping advancement in voting equality precipitated by the VRA, it is easy to 
understand why many in favor of racial equality in electoral processes have hailed the bill as the 
most monumental legislation of the Civil Rights Era. After its passage in 1965, state and local 
authority over elections was severely curtailed, especially for the states subject to preclearance 
under Section 5, which shifted the policymaking burden of proof to the states. The implication of 
VRA legislation became apparent: protection of minorities’ right to representation through 
voting outweighed the reservation of electoral lawmaking power enjoyed by the states. While 
this naturally remains a controversial trade-off, the effect has been a disparity in legislative reach 
between covered and non-covered states until only recently. Moreover, the 1982 expansion of 
the VRA to combat bills that resulted in a discriminatory effect in addition to those intended to 
discriminate marked a continuation of the debate about how the act was implemented.  
 
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE VRA 
In order to understand the body of VRA literature and this analysis, I must first share the 
background and structure of the relevant sections of the Act. The crux of the VRA is found in the 
language of Section 2, which “prohibits voting practices or procedures that discriminate on the 
base of race, color,” or membership in a designated language minority group.6 Unlike other parts 
of the VRA, Section 2 did not have an expiration date, and continues to be in effect today. The 
Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in Mobile v. Bolden held that Section 2 was a restatement of the 
Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits the denial of the right to vote based on race.7 All states, 
counties, cities, and other jurisdictions are subject to Section 2, and lawsuits filed against 
discriminatory voting policies stem from these provisions. 
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 Responding to racial discrimination and disparity in voter turnout in certain regions of the 
United States, Congress’ inclusion of Section 4 in the VRA sought to preempt the possibility of 
restrictive policies by creating a formula for additional coverage and federal review. States and 
political subdivisions were flagged by the Section 4 formula if: the state maintained a “test or 
device” restricting registration or voting (ex. literacy test); and less than 50 percent of the voting 
age population was registered or actually voted in the 1964 presidential election.8 In 1975, this 
formula was expanded to include the practice of providing any election information only in 
English in areas where a “single language minority constituted more that five percent of the 
citizens of voting age.”9 This provision added Alaska, Arizona, and Texas to the list of the fully 
covered states under Section 5. The formula was renewed four times despite no changes being 
made after 1975: in 1970 for five years, 1975 for seven, 1982 for twenty-five, and 2006 for 
twenty-five. It is this section, however, that the Supreme Court invalidated in 2013. Ruling that 
the formula was outdated and therefore unconstitutional, the Court’s decision had serious 
repercussions for Section 5 of the VRA.10 
 The special provisions afforded to the states covered by Section 4 of the VRA were found 
in Section 5, which mandated federal preclearance in these states and subdivisions. Because of 
their history of racial discrimination and restrictive voting practices, all changes regarding voting 
or elections had to be approved by either the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia or by 
the Attorney General.11 The requirement of “preclearance” before enforcement of these laws 
aimed to prevent the discriminatory practices outlined in Section 2. Targeting specific states and 
jurisdictions through the Section 4 formula created the system in which nine states were fully 
covered, and many more counties and townships were individually covered. Due to the 2013 
Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder, Section 5’s preclearance provision no 
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longer applies because Section 4 was ruled unconstitutional. It is important to note, however, that 
if Congress acts to update the Section 4 formula, Section 5 would be restored, as it was not 
directly declared unconstitutional by the Court. 
Before the Supreme Court decision, the conversation about the reach of the VRA 
centered on two opposing outcomes of the legislation. The first factor was the extent to which 
minority citizens were enabled to freely and legally exercise their right to vote, which reflects the 
intent of Congress. Secondly, the degree to which state and local lawmakers were restricted from 
exercising their own authority over the electoral process was a primary concern, too. Scholars 
have studied this delicate balance between the enabling and restrictive components of the 
legislation and unsurprisingly have found it difficult to weigh one against the other. Evaluations 
of the history of the VRA have resulted in competing explanations of its role in American 
democracy. Considering the position of the VRA within federalism specifically, scholars have 
offered a number of perspectives that inform this analysis of how regulation of state legislatures 
interacts with their lawmaking capability. In particular, these include two main areas of analysis 
and critique: challenges to the effectiveness of the VRA today, and the idea of states as 
conquered provinces. The conversation up until now has established that the VRA has unevenly 
limited state legislatures’ election policy autonomy while resulting in greater minority 
representation, but the relationship has not been assessed through a study of which policies have 
been enacted and where, especially since the overturn of the act. 
Much of the historic contestation over the VRA has been due to the tension of election 
law and democracy outlined by Richard Pildes.12 In short, election policies fall on a spectrum 
between “full and fair representation” and “democratic citizenship.”13 The former refers to the 
ideal that the government should reflect the demographic makeup of its constituents, while the 
The VRA and State Behavior 10 
latter endorses the ideal of one vote a person and majority rule. Compounded by the VRA, this 
schism did and continues to form the basis for decisions regarding which policies are denied and 
allowed by the federal government. Building on this dichotomy, much of the scholarly literature 
delves into legal and developmental history, using court cases to show the evolution of the VRA 
and its function in American politics.14  
Of course, the dynamic between race and the VRA has produced a broad scholarly 
discourse. With respect to this extensive research (consult Guinier,15 Hutchings and Valentino,16 
Kousser,17 and Crowley18 for more on race and the VRA), the path of the VRA and its racial 
underpinnings is of less consequence to the question at hand, and should be reserved for other 
analyses. The interaction of race and voting rights is of importance to this analysis only in that it 
continually creates conditions that demand attention from governing bodies and lawmakers, who 
must adhere to the VRA and navigate its regulation when enacting electoral policies. This paper, 
however, focuses on the specific action of state legislatures and local governments that have 
been shaped by the presence of the VRA as the central regulator of election policy. 
 
THE SUCCESS OF SECTION 5 
As for the effect of the VRA on voting patterns, processes, and policies, there is a strong body of 
research that spans the life of the bill. With the coverage formula installed by Section 4, most of 
the states covered overlapped with former Confederate territory, which came as little shock to 
the framers of the legislation. Consequently some of the immediate effects were expected, such 
as increased black registration and turnout. Jeffrey McMillen’s 1994 case study of Jefferson 
Parish in Louisiana outlines the incremental proliferation of the VRA within a singular 
community.19 While giving credit to the bill as a whole for its ability to include blacks in the 
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political process and combat unfair policies, McMillen argues that Section 2 was the true 
“catalyst” of the VRA, in terms of black participation.20 His research concludes that if the 
revolutionary change precipitated by the VRA can happen in Jefferson Parish, a notoriously 
segregated area, it was strong enough to take hold anywhere. 
McMillen’s assessment of the VRA is supported by studies conducted in different times 
and places, and those that address different protected minorities. For instance, Parkin and 
Zlotnick’s study of Latino communities published in 2014 finds that the language requirements 
for registration materials have a positive effect on registration among Latinos who speak English 
very well.21 On a national level, Ansolabehere et al. analyzed the 2008 election with a focus on 
the results from states depending on their preclearance status under Section 5.22 This election 
merited special consideration given that the Democratic nominee, Barack Obama, was black, and 
the study’s results showed progress, albeit incomplete, toward racial acceptance. In this instance, 
the VRA’s provisions seemed to be effective at the state and national level, but racial attitudes 
still played a role in voting patterns, along with ideology, demographics, and partisanship.23 One 
other note of interest is Jared Ellias’ investigation into the VRA in the context of similarly 
structured voting policies from other multi-ethnic democracies around the world, which provides 
different, yet innovative, models of electoral achievement.24 
 A contemporary examination of the recent spate of restrictive policies enacted by states 
and localities further highlights the vital role of Section 5 as a check on electoral discrimination. 
Writing before the Shelby County decision, Keith Bentele and Erin O’Brien’s five-year study 
from 2006 to 2011 leading up to the Supreme Court ruling finds that the restrictive policies are 
prosed and passed in a highly partisan and racialized manner.25 Whereas other scholars viewed 
the VRA as a policy that was either in decline or plateauing in effectiveness prior to 2013, this 
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research argues that the regulatory oversight of the VRA was needed then more than ever. The 
authors categorically reject the notion that “covered states no longer intend to discriminate” by 
performing a statistical analysis showing just the opposite among policies passed within the past 
decade.26 Paired with the overwhelming historical evidence of the impact of the VRA, Bentele 
and O’Brien make a compelling case for its continued renewal and strengthening. 
 One method of strengthening the VRA that has received modest attention at a few 
moments along the Act’s history is the idea of nationwide preclearance. This VRA fix was 
proposed and advocated for by Dwight Aarons in 198827 and again by Hayley Trahan-Liptak 
after the Shelby County decision in 2014.28 The basic idea behind the amendment to the VRA is 
simple: if preclearance under Section 5 prevents some states from enacting restrictive policies, 
why not subject all policies to preliminary inspection? Each of these authors endorses slightly 
different methods of achieving universal preclearance. Aarons expands on a proposal by William 
Keady and George Cochran, calling for a procedure that employs the local federal courts as the 
primary arbiters of potentially discriminatory policies.29 With the Supreme Court decision still 
fresh in her mind, Trahan-Liptak advocates for mandating Department of Justice preclearance for 
any “key changes” to voting requirements, as defined by Congress.30 In order to reach all 
policies in a timely manner, she also suggests streamlining the litigation process for Section 2 by 
allowing the DOJ to take over private cases.31 Both of these arguments in favor of broadening 
preclearance are steeped in law and precedent, perhaps at the expense of considering emerging 
political realities that limit the practicality of such a plan. 
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ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END? 
In the same breath as their praise of the VRA’s accomplishment, scholars share a widespread 
refrain calling for the transformation of the policy as the rate of improvement is thought to be 
stagnating or potentially reversing. Especially as Congress continued to endorse the VRA with 
few changes post-1982, there has been a clamoring for the need to update it into something better 
equipped to address the goals Congress had in mind in 1965. Scholarly proposals about various 
aspects of the VRA include: coalition districts,32 independent redistricting,33 outreach to 
language minorities,34 and an update to Section 2.35  
These remedies all deal with what had been a growing question in political science: 
When will the VRA become obsolete, due to total racial equality at the polls? Although most 
scholars believe that a present need for protection remains, these beliefs have now been tested 
since the Supreme Court overturning of Section 4. Before this decision, however, Samuel 
Issacharoff argued that the preclearance provision had become a “victim of its own success,” due 
to the legislative tactics used to skirt the intent of the law while adhering to its literal 
provisions.36 In many cases, the packing of minority-majority districts perpetuates the 
discriminatory intent of many pre-VRA policies, limiting the ability of blacks to form coalitions 
and spread their political influence.37 Similar concerns are echoed by Michael Burns, who 
questions the ability of Congress to fairly operate by interpreting Section 5’s intent, rather than 
enforcing it provisions.38 The common thread of these studies suggests that the VRA is imperfect 
in accomplishing its primary goals, which factored in to the Supreme Court’s decision to 
overturn Section 4. 
While the discussion above centers around the history and problems with the 
implementation of the VRA with respect to its foremost objectives, little attention has been paid 
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to the institutional changes to federalist government caused by the bill. Specifically, it is difficult 
to quantify the extent to which the constraints imposed by the VRA on state legislatures shaped 
election policies in some ways and limited it in others. It may seem intuitive that VRA regulation 
had a reductive effect on restrictive election policies, but there are instances of this oversight 
where such policies have been enacted. Even with the stipulation that discriminatory outcomes 
are banned, the ability and willingness of the Attorney General to combat the law remains 
necessary. For instance, Georgia’s controversial 2006 Voter ID law was allowed, despite the 
state’s Section 5 coverage, even in the face of internal dissent in the Department of Justice.39 
Partisan jockeying and legal maneuvers leaves the door open for opportunities for legislation to 
be enacted that bypasses the intent of the VRA. Examining the patterns and development of 
policies originating in states covered by Section 5 that were objected to contextualizes the 
measures passed after the Supreme Court decision and provides a more thorough look at the 
reach of the VRA during it’s tenure. 
 The touchstone metaphor to describe the relationship between the federal government 
and states in the context of the VRA is the idea of states as “conquered provinces,” coined by 
Ball et al. in 1982.40 In short, this idea addresses the loss of agency in policymaking by the states 
requiring preclearance. Rather than being free to create and implement their own election 
policies, the federal government wrested control from states, which raised questions in light of 
the Tenth Amendment and its protections. Reevaluated by Christina Rivers in 2006, the concept 
of conquered provinces as a “departure from the traditional concepts of dual federalism” was 
found by her to be still applicable to the then current political landscape.41 
Rivers identifies the 1982 amendment to the VRA as a pivotal moment in creating the 
lasting importance of the VRA. Congress’ update expanded Section 2 to include policies that 
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resulted in racially unequal outcomes as forbidden, rather than solely intended or blatant 
discrimination in electoral opportunities. As Rivers argues, this opened up a new wave of 
policies and states subject to review, which in turn cultivated stronger federal control. In the 
midst of this narrative, blacks and minorities as a whole made enormous strides in representation, 
seemingly a victory for the VRA. Connected back to the previous arguments, though, state action 
must be taken into account, which manifests itself through the specific policies that are passed, 
or – perhaps more to the point – denied under Section 5. 
The answer, as with many political science questions, remains nuanced. While scholars 
do not doubt the progress made regarding the VRA’s intent of racially fair elections, there is 
widespread dissatisfaction with the means by which this end is achieved. In fact, recent research 
shows that the provisions of the VRA were used in some instances to reproduce racial inequality, 
such as purposefully “elusive wording” to trigger Section 5 and litigation delays, and the 
limitation on using race as a means for remedial action, such as creating minority-majority 
districts.42 Furthermore courts ruled that minority rights could be met through “influence 
districts,” rather than majority districts, which had the potential to regress some of the advances 
made under VRA thus far.43 Only covering certain states and localities, the VRA set up an 
uneven playing field for states, leaving it ripe for challenges from state governments. Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court seemed to agree with Issacharoff and Rivers; Section 5 became the “Achilles 
heel” of the VRA, largely because of the unresolved conflict between the state and federal level 
as to where lawmaking power should lie.44 
 
With this in mind, the immediate question following the Shelby County Supreme Court Decision 
from 2013 is to what extent coverage under Section 5 of the VRA affected state and local 
The VRA and State Behavior 16 
policymaking. Less than two years removed from the decision, the response from formerly 
covered states has been rapid and visible. Understanding why state legislatures took action now 
is predicated on understanding what measures were found objectionable while the VRA was in 
effect. Given the near consensus of scholars about the importance of the VRA in principle, the 
fallout from its recent gutting will undoubtedly reshape this field of research. Considering the 
policymaking efforts from 1965 – 2013 and those from mid-2013 and on raises the question of 
how different states and localities behaved under this regulation. Extending the conversation 
toward the laws passed by state and local lawmakers during and after VRA coverage is the 
logical next step in evaluating whether the misgivings about the success and mechanisms put 
forth by VRA scholars were warranted or not. 
 
Evaluating Government Action in Connection to the VRA 
Section 5 of the VRA is unique in how it permeated throughout American democracy. As 
mentioned above, it broke the usual federalism mold, only affected certain states and localities, 
and was caught between two opposing ideals of democracy. The restrictions shouldered by state 
legislatures and local governments surely hampered their election policy goals many times, but 
the extent to which this marked a substantive difference in enacted policies is still up for debate. 
Today, the recent actions taken by state legislatures provide an opportunity to consider the reach 
of Section 5 in a new light, with the benefit of historical data. 
Given this new restoration of state sovereignty, there are two main paths that state 
legislatures could follow. The first is the continuation of similar election policies to those that 
were not objected to under the VRA, from 1965 – 2013. The rationale for this path is that the 
VRA had progressive and lasting effects within the state, thereby changing attitudes and 
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expectations about what policies were acceptable and racially inclusive. This fits into the idea 
that the VRA had run its course and was no longer a necessary regulatory tool. Alternatively, 
these states may have been waiting for the first opportunity to push through legislation that 
would have been objected to through preclearance, which would indicate that the VRA did not 
change how lawmakers evaluate policies. In other words, have states actually reformed from 
Section 5 coverage, or has any decline in restrictive policies been a result of learning what 
specific policies would be blocked via the preclearance process? Quantifying the policy patterns 
in the VRA era helps to assess the extent to which state and local policy preferences were 
prevented, allowing a more informed discussion about the merits of a trade-off between state’s 
rights and voting equality to take place. More pragmatically, these findings have a role in 
directing the debate on the future of preclearance coverage and further VRA reform. 
By examining the connection of state and local policies to recent developments in the 
post-Section 4 era of the VRA, Section 5 can be contextualized with respect to its varied effect 
on state and local government for nearly five decades. Evaluating the arc of states’ policy 
development is key to understanding the reach of Section 5 of the VRA. 
 
How to Assess Policymaking Action in Response to the VRA 
Now that there has been a flurry of state legislative activity in the wake of the Shelby County 
decision, the ideas put forth by previous literature are ready to face initial evaluation. Has the 
VRA outlived its vitality, or was it vanquished too soon? Moreover, to what extent has the reach 
of state legislative power grown? With newfound autonomy in election policy, states have 
wasted little time in passing legislation in the past year. For instance, merely two hours after the 
Supreme Court decision, Texas implemented a photo identification law that had previously been 
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found discriminatory. All told, eight out of the fifteen states that had been subject to Section 5 
have moved toward more restrictive voting policies.45 While the true test of the electoral fallout 
(or lack thereof) from the overturn of Sections 4b and 5 must wait for deeper analysis of the 
election cycles in 2014, 2016, and beyond, the immediate response of state legislatures is likely 
able to foreshadow some of the long-term outcomes. 
In order to completely grasp the significance of the recent changes in voting laws by 
formerly covered states, their legislative capabilities during the VRA period must be understood. 
I explore this phenomenon by coding state election policies from the ten states that were covered 
by Section 5. The majority of this study focuses solely on election laws that were objected to by 
the Attorney General under the Section 5 preclearance procedures. In total, there are 853 
individual policies included, stemming from the nine states that were fully covered by Section 5 
(Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia), 
as well as North Carolina, which had nearly half of its counties covered by the Act. Additionally, 
statewide policies enacted after the Shelby County decision are considered with a more 
qualitative view and in comparison to other states’ action. Studying the changes in state and local 
policies in these states is key to evaluating the overall regulatory effect afforded by the VRA. 
As a point of comparison, I will also examine the recent activity of four states that have 
strong demographic and ideological similarities to one or more of the Section 5 states, yet have 
never been covered in any capacity by this section of the VRA. Included in this analysis are 
Tennessee, Delaware, Arkansas, and Nevada. I argue that these specific cases illustrate the 
struggle to simplify which states are the biggest threats to minority voting rights, despite 
intrastate similarities in minority population or measured prejudice. These quasi-control states 
were chosen in order to mirror the present profile of formerly covered states, since the 
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comparison is mainly confined to after the Shelby County decision. With that in mind, 
Tennessee, Delaware, and Arkansas serve as analogues to the seven southern states in this 
analysis, leaving Nevada to roughly parallel Arizona, Texas, and to a lesser degree, Alaska. 
The demographic and ideological information of the Section 5 states as compared to their 
counterparts are shown in Tables 1 and 2 below. See Appendix 1 for a complete breakdown of 
the relevant statistics for the formerly covered states. Demographic data is from the United States 
Census Bureau, and is drawn from the 2010 census.46 The measure of state ideology is drawn 
from the data analysis of Elmendorf and Spencer, who tabulated responses to the 2008 National 
Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) and recorded the percentage of a state’s residents who 
scored at least one standard deviation above the national average on racial prejudice.47 This data 
is presented as a rank relative to the other 49 states, and the District of Colombia, and a lower 
number means greater prejudice against blacks. 
DEMOGRAPHY 
AND IDEOLOGY 
AL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, VA Arkansas Delaware Tennessee 
Black Population 28.2% 15.6% 22.0% 17.0% 
Prejudice Rank 6.9 6 12 13 
TABLE 1: Demography and Ideology of Racial Minority States 
Source: US Census Bureau, 2010; Election Law Blog 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHY AND IDEOLOGY Alaska* Arizona Texas Nevada 
Hispanic (*Indigenous) Population 14.8% 30.2% 38.2% 27.3% 
Prejudice Rank 40 43 3 42 
TABLE 2: Demography and Ideology of Language Minority States 
Source: US Census Bureau, 2010; Election Law Blog 
 
 
While some may point out that this is only a thin slice of the 35 states that were never 
subject to preclearance, evaluating these policy approaches is valuable because it has the ability 
to narrow the analytical lens of this research. Considering these four states in the period after the 
Supreme Court decision in mid-2013 contextualizes the immediate actions of the ten formerly 
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covered states. Judging the responses of these two types of states informs the discussion about 
whether any version of Section 5 makes sense, and what the VRA coverage formula got right 
and wrong. By placing modest controls on demographics and ideology, this juxtaposition 
becomes more meaningful. In short, the policies pursued by demographically similar states shed 
light as to whether the VRA was correctly targeted, which informs the discussion on the 
competing merits of the balance between federal regulation over electoral policies and state 
autonomy in lawmaking. As Chief Justice Roberts argued in his majority decision, the VRA 
“applies substantive standards quite different” to the Section 5 covered states.48 Testing these 
cases uncovers whether these burdensome standards are merited, or only due to judgments on 
outdated demographics. 
Finally, the individual cases from the ten Section 5 states are analyzed based on when the 
Attorney General objected to them. As a reminder, the period of 1965-1982 encompassed the 
beginning of the VRA and its additions of Texas, Arizona, and Alaska with the 1975 
amendments, and ends with the amendments of 1982. The next period, 1982-2013, marks the 
time after the change from the VRA banning restrictive intent to restrictive results. Of course, 
the recent legislation stemming from these states will also be examined to take a first look at the 
consequences of the Supreme Court decision. As a whole, these eras of the VRA will provide an 
approximate assessment of states’ trajectories over the Act’s history. 
For operationalization, there are two key ideas that need to be expanded on: policy 
autonomy, and electorally restrictive policies. The study uses the freedom that states and local 
governments have had in enacting laws that specifically implicate the electoral process to 
compare states’ behavior to each another. The basic framework for this variable is broken into 
the three aforementioned periods of the VRA. First, the years from 1965-1982 marks a period in 
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which covered states were barred from passing legislation that was intentionally discriminatory. 
The following period, beginning after June 29, 1982 and lasting until the Supreme Court’s 
decision in 2013, decreased policy autonomy by instructing objection to policies that resulted in 
a discriminatory effect. Lastly, the period from 2013 on marks the greatest policy autonomy for 
formerly covered states by waiving the need for federal preclearance. For the purpose of this 
study, the concept of electorally restrictive policies includes laws that suppress popular 
participation in elections by either limiting turnout or creating unequal conditions for eligible 
voters in a way that disadvantages racial or language minority populations.  
In all cases, unless otherwise mentioned, an electorally restrictive policy will have to fall 
into or resemble one of the following categories, which will be more fully explained below: 
districting, structural, procedural, registration, or suppression. Districting policies for 
congressional districts that do not originate from the state legislature are not included. Currently, 
the only states in the study affected in this way are Arizona (independent commission), Virginia 
(advisory commission), and Alaska (one representative and therefore no districts).49 Otherwise, 
districting decisions are at the purview of state and local officials, and therefore are necessary for 
this analysis. Any electorally restrictive policies not included among these categories are a result 
of fitting into multiple categories. Such laws are marked as “multiple categories.” One type of 
policy that resulted in many objections but is not included here is annexation. As cities and 
counties annexed neighboring areas, districting plans would often be objected to as they failed to 
account for the demographic shift in population. Since these policies were rarely enacted in an 
effort to affect elections and because the Attorney General’s objection was often overturned after 
a new plan was submitted, annexation policies have been omitted from this study. 
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 These measures of electoral restriction are reliable largely due to the uniformity of 
classification between states. While there is surely nuance, policies that address each of the 
outlined areas of election law usually fit into one (or more) of the broad categories. The 
interaction between the legislation and the VRA is clear and part of the public record; all of the 
Department of Justice Section 5 objections are catalogued online. Furthermore, this class of 
policies have been viewed, and often proven, to have a negative effect on the ability of minority 
voters to select candidates of their choice. Validity of this study is therefore supported both by 
the body research which showed a decline in discrimination in voting practices with the ban of 
these electorally restrictive policies,50 and by recent scholarship which indicates that recent 
policies post-VRA are widely disenfranchising. The Brennan Center for Justice’s analysis of 
restrictive voting legislation reported that the laws could make voting a “significant” challenge 
for more than 5 million eligible voters in 2012.51 Although one study suggested that early voting 
may actually decrease turnout,52 the effect may not be uniform across racial, economic, and 
language backgrounds. Since the VRA was enacted with the intent of specifically protecting 
minority voting rights, policies that may not affect overall turnout, yet disproportionately affect 
certain populations, fall under the Act’s purview. To paraphrase the 1982 VRA amendments, the 
results outweigh the intent. 
Identification and examination of the relevant election policies for this study are found 
primarily through the historical archives of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). The 
DOJ records all of the Attorneys General’s objection letters for each Section 5 violation by 
state.53 These data will provide the specific cases of municipal, county, and state legislation that 
were objected to by the Attorney General, meaning that they were denied after enactment via the 
preclearance process. Considering that bills have historically been objected to by the Attorney 
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General at a rate of only about one percent of the total number reviewed, it is vital to isolate the 
particular instances of discriminatory state and local action.54 This source includes all of the 
necessary data except for the four quasi-control states and for all states after 2013. 
To supplement the DOJ and include the states that were never covered by Section 5, I 
primarily use cases compiled by the Brennan Center for Justice report on restrictive policies after 
2010,55 as well as the elections legislation database from the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL).56 These additional resources only include statewide policies, leaving out 
municipal and county level laws. Accordingly, the aspect of this study covered by these sources 
takes on a more qualitative look at recent patterns in election policy and their place among 
historical developments. 
Motivated by my hypothesis that the policies in periods of more state autonomy results in 
a greater rate of electorally restrictive policies, my data collection includes almost all of the 
policies objected to under Section 5 for each of the ten covered states. The strategy for 
evaluating and charting this state and local behavior consists of coding each of the states’ 
policies on the following analytical dimensions: 
• Date of Objection 
• State/County/City Level of Government 
• Electoral Restriction Category 
These measures will allow my analysis to incorporate multiple approaches to the idea of state 
variation in election policy. These three categories, along with the policy itself, cover the What, 
When, Where, and How of each objectionable policy. Isolating these criteria is an important part 
of revising the VRA to be better targeted at preventing discriminatory policies. Part of the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Shelby County was that Congress had not “eased the restrictions of 
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Section 5 or narrowed the scope of the coverage formula” when reauthorizing the VRA.57 
Ignoring the “current data reflecting current needs”58 was part of Section 4’s demise, and 
necessitates a fresh look at state and local behavior under the VRA to inform a new policy 
direction today. 
The number of restrictive policies objected to provide a preliminary picture of the relative 
policy overreach of each state. Comparing the rate of restrictive policies over time may indicate 
trends in overall objections due to state and local autonomy or in particular states with respect to 
the type of policies objected to. Understanding these historical trends by when and where they 
take place is crucial for evaluating the disparate impact of Section 5 across various jurisdictions. 
Additionally, this categorization of policy data will support the contemporary comparison 
between states that were covered by Section 5, as well as those which were never covered. 
Examining the actions of other, similar states can further contextualize the most recent pattern of 
policy behavior uncovered in some or all of the Section 5 states. This hybrid between 
quantitative and qualitative data is well suited to assess state and local policies, notably because 
of the many policies objected to under Section 5 as well as the many different ways that states 
have attempted to circumvent the VRA’s provisions. 
 This design aims to delve deeper into the behavior of states and localities in response to 
regulation via the VRA. The contrast that I predict between Section 5 covered and non-covered 
states, as well as discrepancies among the covered states at different periods of autonomy, can 
speak to the emerging debate over the future of the VRA about if a new coverage formula is 
necessary and, if so, what it should look like. Centering my research on policies that are carefully 
coded as electorally restrictive, particularly for minority voters, will provide a clear analysis of 
the different policy decisions among the studied states. 
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Having said this, there are a few potential problems that may result from my case 
selection and method. First, the four quasi-control states do not have any similar archive of 
policies that, in this case, would have been objected to under Section 5. Without a directly 
analogous measure, these states serve primarily as a glimpse into the behavior of never-covered 
states, especially in the recent period in which all states have been under the same regulation. 
Demographics and even ideological measures do not tell the whole story, but the comparison can 
remain valuable as part of the overall narrative of variation in electoral policies. Considering the 
concept of electorally restrictive policies, there is no straightforward way to measure which 
policy is more or less restrictive in nature. Since this concept is not directly quantifiable, the 
resulting data may overstate the action of some states while missing the severity of restriction in 
states with potentially fewer policies overall. For instance, a single polling place location change 
is counted as one policy, as is an omnibus bill including districting and structural changes. 
Finally, this approach considers state legislatures and local governments as if they act in a 
vacuum, with little reaction to external forces. Surely, election policies are often part of larger 
partisan or nationwide trends, and the notion that lawmakers do not alter their policymaking 
focuses in response to VRA regulation is impractical. These concerns will be addressed more 
completely in the discussion following the results of the study below. In sum, this analysis of 
election policies over the history of VRA enforcement of Section 5 serves as an indication of 
which policies states favored, the variance in state behavior, and how the VRA affected state 
practices in policymaking. 
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Tracking Section 5: State Variation in Policy and Purpose 
With the benefit of hindsight, the initial coverage formula in Section 4 of the VRA may seem to 
be rough around the edges at best. The inclusion of states based on a discriminatory tool or 
device to limit voting, black turnout for a single election, or the number of minority language 
speakers may have been a blunt tool with which to address the larger issue of unimpeded access 
to voting for racial and ethnic minorities. As will shortly become clear if it is not already, racism 
and discriminatory election practices did not evaporate after the 1960s. As state politics and 
demographics changed, the coverage formula of the VRA remained the same. Mapping the 
policies deemed objectionable by the Attorney General over the life of Section 5 helps expose 
and disentangle which states were most hindered in passing election policies and which states 
operated relatively free of federal objection. 
 In the following analysis, I consider state behavior across four key metrics in order to 
understand their policy trajectory under the VRA. These include the total number of policies that 
were objected to, the time period in which each policy objected to, the level of government 
responsible for each policy, and the category of electoral restriction in each policy. As mentioned 
above, these 853 policies are categorized into five types of electoral restriction: districting, 
structural, procedural, registration, and suppression. 
Districting – 344 Total Policies 
These policies include state, county, and city attempts at drawing voting district boundaries in 
such a way to disadvantage racial or language minority populations. Restrictive policies in this 
category often occur through packing minority-majority districts or fragmenting black or 
Hispanic populations. As a whole, this process is referred to as malapportionment, meaning that 
the districts are unfairly distributed over the population of a region. 
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 Districting is the most common type of policy in this study, and examples of this type of 
electoral restriction can be found in any of the ten states in this analysis. In fact, it is not 
uncommon to find instances of states or counties having multiple policies objected to during the 
same period of redistricting, as was the case in Barbour County, Alabama in 1981 or the State of 
Mississippi in 1991.  
Structural – 310 Total Policies 
Policies included in this category implicate many different aspects of elections, but can broadly 
be defined as those that alter the rules or methods of elections or government structure in a way 
that disadvantages minority electoral influence. Examples of this include replacing single-
member districted elections with at-large elections; changing elected positions into appointed 
positions; and requiring candidates receive a majority of the votes to win, rather than a plurality. 
 Two of the most prevalent structural restrictive policies at the county and city levels of 
government were numbered posts and staggered terms. Numbered posts institute pseudo-single-
member districts by having candidates represent a specific district, but they are voted on at-large. 
Staggered terms meant that a majority white community could elect their choice of council 
member, for example, every election. Without staggered terms, electing the top two-supported 
candidates could result in a candidate favored by the black minority. Of the 310 total structural 
policies included, about half involved at least one of these two policy proposals. 
Procedural – 110 Total Policies 
The restrictive policies contained in the procedural category are some of the most highly visible 
initiatives that many people immediately think of when they envision discriminatory election 
laws. Most simply, these policies change the process by which people cast their ballots, or the 
schedule of implementation for other election policy changes. Objections to procedural policies 
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are often directed at polling place relocations, voter identification requirements, lack of bilingual 
materials, and the selection of election dates that hinder certain segments of the electorate. 
 Additionally, many states and counties attempted to pass policies limiting assistance to 
illiterate or disabled voters. For instance, Mississippi twice tried to disallow assistance to 
illiterate, blind, and disabled voters in 1969 and 1979, policies that were objected to by the 
Attorney General because of the disparate impact on minority communities without a compelling 
state interest. Procedural policy objections center on equal access to the polls, a cornerstone of 
the VRA. 
Registration – 27 Total Policies 
Many states and localities attempted to use the registration process as a method of limiting 
minority electoral influence. Policies in this category include those that place unequal or 
unnecessary restrictions on the timing or location required for voter registration. Other policies 
range from inadequate access to bilingual materials to voter purges and a mandatory re-
identification process, which aimed to slash the number of eligible minority voters. 
 One of the more extreme examples of discriminatory registration policies is drawn from 
DeKalb County, Georgia, where Section 5 prevented neighborhood registration drives from 
being outright banned in 1980 and from being restricted to even-numbered years in 1982. 
Obstructing the registration process almost always constitutes discriminatory policy, as minority 
populations are often under-registered to begin with. 
Suppression – 23 Total Policies 
Policies that fall into the suppression category are usually targeted at candidates, political parties, 
or both. The most common policy objections of this type include increases in candidate filing 
fees or signature requirements, and additional candidate qualifications, such as an educational 
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requirement for school board members. Other instances of suppression limited independent or 
new parties from participating in primary elections. A 1969 law in Alabama denying access to 
the primary election for newly formed (read: black) political parties was struck down by the 
Attorney General and represents one of these handful of objections. 
Multiple Categories – 39 Total Policies 
This category serves as a catchall for all of the policies that fit into more than one of the above 
categories. While these policies are often a combination between structural and districting 
restrictions, there are also a few instances of structural and suppression policies, and even one 
procedural and registration policy. In the most common type of policy in this category, counties 
and cities alter representation to single-member districts – a goal of the VRA – while 
simultaneously redistricting to produce new districts that are severely malapportioned. For 
example, this tactic garnered Texas 13 objections between 1980 and 1993. 
 
As the following analysis suggests, there is little uniformity to the policy path followed by states 
formerly covered under Section 5. Some general tendencies do shine through when comparing 
state and local policies over time and among policy categories. More arresting patterns develop 
within certain states, however, particularly when examining the specific policies in question. 
After considering the nearly fifty year interplay between these states and Section 5, the 
comparison to the actions of similar states and the post-coverage period provides further insight 
into the overarching influence of the VRA. All of the policies considered are drawn from the 
DOJ records on Section 5 objections. The complete dataset and supporting information not 
included in this section can be found on a Google Spreadsheet available via the link in the 
references section or the embedded hyperlink in this footnote.59 
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SAME COVERAGE, DIFFERENT OUTCOMES 
First and foremost, it is essential to underscore the fact that the states covered by Section 5 did 
not and do not operate as a single unit. Surely there are similarities in both types and timing of 
policies, but each of the ten states forged its own relationship with the VRA. Note the variation 
in both total number of Section 5 objections (Chart 1) and the rate of objections as I briefly 
describe each state’s Section 5 profile. 
Alabama – 77 Total Objections; 1.60 Objections/Year 
As one of the states most associated with the Civil Rights Movement, it may come as no surprise 
that Alabama has its fair share of Section 5 objections. In many ways, however, the state 
represents the middle ground of the study, aligning near the center in both total policies objected 
to and the rate of objections by level of government and by category of policy. Interestingly, 
Alabama saw only three objections after 1994, after averaging over 12 objections every five 
years beforehand. Despite this rapid decline, Alabama’s Shelby County played the central role as 
the petitioner in the now landmark 2013 Supreme Court case. 
Alaska – 1; 0.03/year 
Clearly the outlier of the Section 5 covered states, Alaska only received one objection from the 
Attorney General in its 37 years of required preclearance. The 1993 state redistricting plan for 
the state house and senate was found to be malapportioned with regards to the Native Alaskan 
population. Remember Alaska’s miniscule sample size when viewing the rate-based charts 
below. 
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Arizona – 19; 0.50/year 
Arizona had the second fewest objections, trailing only Alaska. Covered since 1975, the 
objections are concentrated in the decade between 1984-1994 (74% of all policies), and deal 
primarily with redistricting that fragmented Hispanic populations. Notably, Arizona was also 
covered for its Native American population, a population that was at the center of a 2003 
objection to a change to at-large voting for the Coconino County Association for Vocations, 
Industry, and Technology. 
Georgia – 145; 3.02/year 
As one of the “Big 3” offenders along with Mississippi and Texas, Georgia policies were 
structurally restrictive in over half of the cases. Seemingly every city in the state borrowed from 
one another and attempted to enact laws regarding numbered posts, at-large elections, staggered 
terms, or majority vote requirements. Moreover, Georgia was one of only two states that had 
77	  
1	   19	  
145	   117	  
149	  
46	  
101	  
173	  
25	  
0	  20	  
40	  60	  
80	  100	  
120	  140	  
160	  180	  
200	  
To
ta
l	  N
um
be
r	  
of
	  O
bj
ec
ti
on
s	  
State	  
CHART 1: Total VRA Section 5 Objections by State 
Note: Alaska, Arizona, and Texas were not covered until 1975 
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most of its objections result from city-level policies, largely a construct of the general 
administrative level of the state. 
Louisiana – 117; 2.44/year 
Perhaps Louisiana could be characterized as an unglamorous offender. Besides an attempt at a 
photo identification requirement for registration in 1994, the state overwhelmingly produced 
relatively straightforward districting policies (72% of all policies), originating from the county 
level (70%), that were struck down due to malapportionment. Thinking back to McMillen’s case 
study of Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, the number of objections in the state supports McMillen’s 
assertion that “Section 5 has prevented Jefferson Parish from dodging the law as it did so 
successfully for almost 100 years.”60 The same sentiment can be applied to the entire state. 
Mississippi – 149; 3.10/year 
The next of the “Big 3,” Mississippi’s Section 5 objections mostly came from districting policies, 
with about 68% of all policies containing some type of malapportionment. Another pivotal state 
in the Civil Rights Movement, Mississippi was one of the states most vehemently active to stack 
the electoral deck against black voters via fragmentation and packing. About two thirds of the 
state’s policies originate at the county level, indicating the most influential governing body for 
much of the state. 
North Carolina – 46; 0.96/year 
The only state in the study not completely covered by Section 5, North Carolina has a noticeably 
lower total number of objectionable policies than its southern neighbors. Similar to Georgia 
cities, North Carolina counties appeared to copy nearly identical structural policies in an effort to 
skirt federal oversight, resulting in numerous objections to numbered posts and staggered terms. 
Lacking complete Section 5 coverage, it is easy to speculate on the actions of the non-covered 
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counties and localities in the state. However, it is important to note that this study does not 
incorporate the differences between localities within North Carolina. 
South Carolina – 101; 2.10/year 
As one of the states historically known for asserting itself against the federal government, it is no 
surprise that South Carolina faced many Section 5 objections over the course of its coverage. 
Reflecting its northern counterpart, South Carolina counties also borrowed from one another, and 
at-large elections and majority vote requirements were the discriminatory practices en vogue in 
the state for much of the 1970s. Despite ranking fifth in total policies objected to, South Carolina 
had the most suppressive policies with seven, suggesting that the state had an increased focus on 
preventing strong minority leaders and parties from gaining traction. 
Texas – 173; 4.55/year 
Everything is bigger in Texas, and the amount of Section 5 objections is no exception. In ten 
fewer years of coverage, Texas amassed more objections than any other state and exhausted the 
Attorney General’s office with a steady stream of discriminatory policies. Most remarkably, the 
state received 60 objections in its first five years of coverage. Representing a mix of structural 
and districting policies, this initial upheaval indicated that Texas was unique in that it didn’t 
neatly fit in with either the language- or race-based categories of states. Instead, the heavily 
populated state of Texas combined a significant ethnic minority (Hispanic) with a history of 
racial discrimination (like other southern states), all contributing to its staggering number of 
objections. 
Virginia – 25; 0.52/year 
In many ways, Virginia is the exception to blanket statements about the southern states covered 
by Section 5. The state certainly was not immune to objections, but the quantity is significantly 
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lower than its covered neighbors to the south. While most of the Virginia’s objections stemmed 
from malapportioned districts, there is a sprinkling of polling place relocations and structural 
changes, as well. The lack of a concentrated period of objections and lower overall total suggests 
that there is not a Virginia equivalent to the policy copying observed in many of the other studied 
states. 
 
What can we learn from the differences in state 
behavior and its rate of objection? First, it is critical to 
note that the one-to-one comparison of the policies that 
were objected to is a rough measure that does not 
adequately consider the relative “restrictiveness” 
of a policy, nor the maliciousness (or lack thereof) 
of the policymakers. However, the gap between Alaska and Texas should inspire closer 
examination. Perhaps states such as Alaska, Arizona, and Virginia should not have been captured 
under Section 4b’s coverage formula. Is the benefit of stopping about one policy every two years 
worth reviewing each and every election policy these states produce? If so, then why not institute 
nationwide preclearance, as Aarons and Trahan-Liptak have argued? Of course, no state had the 
same number of policy objections year to year. Like the variation among the states, there has 
been a changing dynamic of Section 5 objections over time. 
 
UNPACKING THE DECLINE OVER TIME 
To assess any possible future directions of the Voting Rights Act, we must understand where 
enforcement of Section 5 stood before the Supreme Court decision in 2013. Looking back over 
State Objections/Year 
Alabama 1.60 
Alaska 0.03 
Arizona 0.50 
Georgia 3.02 
Louisiana 2.44 
Mississippi 3.10 
North Carolina 0.96 
South Carolina 2.10 
Texas 4.55 
Virginia 0.52 
TABLE 3: VRA Objections per Year by State 
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the history of policy objections by state uncovers a few prominent trends that merit explanation. 
Most noteworthy, the sharp decline in Section 5 objections in the 21st century seen in Chart 2 
raises questions about state behavior as well as federal standards of regulation.  
While the variation in total objections between the states renders the tracking five-year 
periods into a jumble of lines seen in Chart 2, there are general upticks that align with the 
beginning of each decade: 1970-74, 1980-84, and 1990-94. Much of this phenomenon is 
explained by the coupling of the decennial census and the state redistricting cycle. States, 
counties, and cities submitted redistricting plans within the first few years after a new census, 
and many of these proposals were discriminatory due to malapportionment. As the largest single 
category of policy objections, the districting bump can be readily detected among the states. 
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The complete breakdown of five-year periods by state can be found below in Table 4, 
which includes a few other outliers. As discussed above, Texas’ first five years under Section 5 
saw an incredible rate of objection, as many policies were becoming subjected to preclearance 
for the first time. Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas all experienced at 
least double the objections from the 1985-1989 period to the 1990-1994 period. This rapid jump 
is tied directly with districting policy, but more research into the changes in state initiatives or 
shifts in Attorney General regulation is necessary to tease out what precipitated the rise. Some of 
the states exhibit policy clumping, in which similar policies are rejected within a few years of 
one another as a result of the borrowing that occurs, usually between local levels of government. 
Time Period Alabama Alaska Arizona Georgia Louisiana 
1965 - 1969 10 - - 5 0 
1970 - 1974 12 - - 31 30 
1975 - 1979 12 0 2 31 6 
1980 - 1984 19 0 2 26 14 
1985 - 1989 8 0 4 14 2 
1990 - 1994 13 1 9 26 49 
1995 - 1999 1 0 0 1 6 
2000 - 2004 0 0 2 5 7 
2005 - 2009 2 0 0 3 2 
2010 - 2013 0 0 0 3 1 
Time Period Mississippi North Carolina South Carolina Texas Virginia 
1965 - 1969 2 0 0 - 0 
1970 - 1974 21 4 17 - 6 
1975 - 1979 18 5 22 60 1 
1980 - 1984 35 9 15 25 7 
1985 - 1989 15 15 11 21 2 
1990 - 1994 46 8 22 48 3 
1995 - 1999 7 2 5 3 1 
2000 - 2004 1 1 7 5 5 
2005 - 2009 0 1 0 3 0 
2010 - 2013 4 1 2 8 0 
TABLE 4: Number of VRA Section 5 Objections by Time Period and State 
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 The most curious aspect of the data charting Section 5 objections over time is the sudden 
drop-off in policy objections beginning in the 1995-1999 period and continuing all the way 
through 2013. At first glance, this decline in objections appears to be evidence supporting the 
research of Issacharoff, Rivers, McMillen, and others who believed that the VRA and 
preclearance had begun to run its course. Through this line of thinking, it reasons that states and 
localities may have acclimated to a lawmaking climate where policies that would be objected to 
were no longer a part of the legislative discourse. If states had learned to not discriminate, 
perhaps the provisions of Section 5 were no longer necessary. 
An alternative interpretation of the idea that states learned in response to decades of 
regulation is more cynical. Maybe states and localities merely leaned how to best avoid 
objections, or where to toe the line between acceptable and discriminatory. This argument was a 
sticking point for the four dissenting Supreme Court Justices in 2013, best summed up by Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, who quipped, “throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing 
to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm 
because you are not getting wet.”61 Assessing the policy behavior of formerly covered states 
after the preclearance requirement was lifted in 2013 is a fundamental part of evaluating which 
kind of learning each state exhibited with the early 2000s decline in objections. 
 Another angle from which to approach the drop in policy objections is the regulatory side 
of the VRA and the Attorneys General. Under President George W. Bush, three different men 
held the office: John Ashcroft, Alberto Gonzales, and Michael Mukasey. While more research 
into the matter is necessary, it is plausible that an executive branch directive could be responsible 
for the stringency of Section 5 enforcement. The case of Georgia’s 2006 voter identification law 
lends legitimacy to this argument, as Department of Justice staff members circulated a memo 
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addressing the risk of vote dilution, but were ultimately overruled by a partisan appointee.62 
Moreover, the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ, which handles the Section 5 reviewing process, 
lost “nearly 20 percent of its lawyers in 2005” and appears to be moving toward a more partisan 
operation.63 Given the severity of the decline, it is likely a combination of both state learning and 
federal enforcement that created a climate of few objections in first decade-plus of the century. 
 The expected delineation marking a divide between the pre- and post-1982 amendments 
was not ultimately realized. Contrary to Christina Rivers’ emphasis on the “conquered 
provinces,” the 1982 shift from discriminatory intent to discriminatory results, seemed to be little 
more than a formality. Table 4 shows that states did not experience a significant rise in policy 
objections after 1982, and the uptick in the early 1990s is countered by the sharp decline 
immediately after. Perhaps an even more informative illustration of this continuity in 
enforcement standards is found in the text of the objection letters themselves. For instance, 
almost all objections prior to 1982 contain the phrase, “we are unable to conclude…that the 
imposition of [policy] will not have a racially discriminatory effect.”64 While more recent 
objections refer to the application of Section 5 to both intent and effect, most prior objections 
comfortably equated the discriminatory effect with evidence of intent. This reading of the VRA 
was probably more practical, as it is much simpler to judge results as opposed to the inner 
motivations of the lawmakers. With this new perspective, the 1982 amendments remain 
important because of their symbolic weight more so than their practical effects. 
 Before the mid-1990s, state and local electoral policymaking faced far more objections 
than afterward. Due to complimentary forces in state and local governments along with the 
Department of Justice, the number of total objections drastically declined. While this change 
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contextualizes the climate in which the Supreme Court acted to undermine preclearance, it does 
not tell us whether discriminatory policy initiatives actually declined at such a rate. 
 
ORIGINS OF OBJECTIONS  
As is often the case in American politics, the highest profile contests and issues command a 
disproportionate amount of attention compared to the areas that are actually closest to the voters. 
The same principle applies to Section 5 objections, which originated from policies introduced at 
the local level (county or city) in over 85% of the cases (See Chart 3 and Table 5 below). This 
domination of local policy is certainly a reflection of the sheer number of counties, cities, towns, 
and other municipalities in place to form policy, but it also reflects the amount of influence 
wielded by local lawmakers. 
 One quirk in the data is two of the biggest offenders, Georgia and Texas, have a higher 
frequency of city-level policies than county-level policies. As mentioned briefly above, this is 
certainly an outcome of the administrative structure of each state, but it also illustrates the 
challenge of targeting a blanket coverage formula across many states and localities. Learning 
where policy originates from state to state is necessary in making a future coverage plan that is 
effective in its application. 
The policy objections emerging from county and city policies are marked by their 
uniformity in type and diversity in application. In other words, theses policies may be similar in 
content, but are frequently molded to any form of government in order to prevent minority 
influence. For instance, the 344 districting policies objected to all have some form of 
malapportionment involved, but apply to city councils, county commissioners, city or county 
school districts, college board districts, and even one underground water conservation district. 
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The breadth of attempts to disadvantage minority voters is thrust into view after only a few 
minutes of perusing the DOJ archives; it is not uncommon for a single city or county to have 
amassed five or more policy objections over a period of a few decades. 
  
On the other hand, the scarcity of state policies in this study should not be mistaken for 
unimportance. When states receive objections under Section 5, the electoral issue involved 
receives widespread scrutiny. For example, congressional redistricting has become must-view 
legislative action as the problems associated with gerrymandered districts have fully penetrated 
the public consciousness. Other state policies become high profile in part because they affect so 
many people by changing voting procedures. This category includes voter identification, 
assistance to illiterate voters, ballot design, and changes in election dates, all of which are 
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tangible differences for many voters, whereas understanding the structural system by which 
candidates win elections is less accessible to the average voter. 
 
In the months since the Shelby County decision, almost all of the attention has been 
directed toward state legislatures and their electoral policy initiatives. While I perpetuate the 
same focus in this paper due to the lack of available data and the broad conclusions that can be 
drawn from state action, it is vital to continue studying the behavior of local governments, which 
are shown here to be the primary gatekeepers of discriminatory power structures. 
 
RESTRICTIVE POLICIES: MECHANISMS AND DEVELOPMENT 
Although likely redundant after the preceding rundowns of state policy histories and the 
categories of restrictive policies in this study, I will reiterate the fact that the two most common 
types of policy objections under Section 5 are districting and structural. The overall rate of 
Section 5 objection by category can be seen below in Chart 4. The impersonal nature of the two 
most prominent categories is potentially indicative of state and local government preferences 
with considering the most effective method of discrimination. States and localities often faced 
multiple rejections for a single attempt at redistricting, such as Mississippi in 1991 and stretching 
into 1992. Of course, this component of districting inflates the total number of policies, but also 
Gov. Level Alabama Alaska Arizona Georgia Louisiana 
State 15 1 4 17 12 
County 48 0 15 53 82 
City 14 0 0 75 23 
Gov. Level Mississippi North Carolina South Carolina Texas Virginia 
State 22 13 12 13 6 
County 101 23 53 65 10 
City 26 10 36 95 9 
TABLE 5: Total Number of Section 5 Objections by Level of Government and State 
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underscores the stubbornness of states and counties that refused to adhere to the 
recommendations of the Attorney General after one or even two objections. 
 
 Structural policies also resulted in multiple attempts, at times. Multi-membered districts 
and majority vote requirements often were tweaked in search of approval only to face objection 
once again. Much of what sets structural policies apart is the role of context. A malapportioned 
district is not acceptable in any context, but an at-large seat can be either restrictive or not, 
depending on specifics regarding majority voting, other districts, and requirements to be a 
candidate. This ambiguity contributed to the borrowing referred to previously in this paper, 
where counties and cities copied one another’s policies in hope that their version would not be 
objected to. While this method undoubtedly worked in some jurisdictions, many others were met 
with the same objections from the Attorney General. 
 Less than one quarter of the policy objections deal with some of the most pressing issues 
of today: voting identification, early voting, and registration requirements. With procedural laws 
Chart 4: Overall VRA Section 5 Objections by Category 
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such as voter identification, it is often easier to recognize where and how discrimination could 
occur. As mentioned above, this propels these types of policies into the public eye and opens 
them up for study and debate.  
 Chart 5 sheds a different light on the dominance of districting and structural policies in 
Section 5 objections. Boundaries and election methods were the underlying mechanisms to the 
majority of restrictive electoral policy development throughout the VRA era, which resulted in 
policy objections addressing those areas. Considering the 21st century decline in policy 
objections once again, it is difficult to track where and how states changed their policy path, at 
least when only using the DOJ records. However, districting policies are now often discussed in 
a partisan context as opposed to an ethnic or racial perspective. Note that direct suppression is 
the smallest single category of policy objection in every state. This indicates that policymakers 
may shy away from the most overt discriminatory tactics in favor of those that are less obvious 
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on the surface. Granted, this is speculative since the data for the policies that were not objected 
to are not a part of this study. Nevertheless, identifying where states and localities use stand-ins 
such as partisanship, economic status, or education level to implicitly target minority populations 
is crucial in the ongoing effort combatting discriminatory policies. Just as malapportionment, 
numbered posts, and educational requirements were used to obstruct minority influence in the 
VRA era, similar practices are still around today, albeit in different forms. 
 
THE DIFFERENCE MADE BY BURDEN OF PROOF 
Returning to the comparison of the ten covered states to those that have never been covered by 
Section 5 of the VRA underscores the unparalleled relationship forged via preclearance. In this 
brief examination of Arkansas, Delaware, Tennessee, and Nevada – states that are similar to the 
covered states at least on a superficial level – I find that their experiences are incredibly 
divergent from that of the covered states. Probing into the history of these quasi-control cases 
shows a policy arc that is relatively free of federal interference, but recent activity suggests that 
this does not directly equate to policymaking that is not restrictive in nature. 
 Without directly comparable data, there is not a way of coding and analyzing the election 
policy histories of the non-covered states in the same way as above. However, the Department of 
Justice does maintain records of the various court cases arising under provisions of the VRA.65 In 
this archive, there are only four federal cases that originated in the four quasi-control states 
studied here, two in Tennessee and one in both Arkansas and Nevada. In Tennessee, the U.S. 
Government challenged a 2001 Crockett County policy regarding minority vote dilution due to 
the districting plan for the election of county commissioners and was the only one of the four 
cases stemming from VRA provisions.66 The other instances of legal action in the state addressed 
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Tennessee’s implementation of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA),67 
Arkansas’ Pulaski County implementation of Section 8 of the NVRA,68 and Nevada’s 2010 
compliance issue with the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA).69 
Although only one policy here violated the VRA specifically and was met with legal redress, it 
would be naïve to think that they were the only potentially objectionable policies passed in these 
four states over the half-century of the VRA’s existence. 
Undoubtedly, these instances of VRA regulation over non-covered states are dwarfed by 
the reach Section 5 had into state policies. Rather than being indicative of a stark divide between 
never covered states and formerly covered states, this lack of federal regulation is better 
explained by the reversal in burden of proof from state or local government to federal 
government. Instead of requiring states to justify changing their election policies in light of the 
impact of the laws on minority electoral influence, without preclearance the federal government 
must prove that the populations in question suffer as a result of the policy. The latter approach 
sets a much higher bar of objection and often requires lengthy legal battles, making it no surprise 
that there have been far fewer VRA court cases overturning state policy than Section 5 
objections. Delving into the behavior of the two groups of states after the Supreme Court 
decision left them in equal standing is necessary in order to uncover a more telling comparison of 
policy direction. 
While the action, or lack thereof, of the four control states does not provide great insight 
into the overall interactions between the fifty states and the VRA, it does show that simple 
indicators such as racial makeup and ideology do not solely drive policy. This is hardly a 
revolutionary idea, but it does invite additional factors into the discussion about the source of 
restrictive policies, such as policy history and partisanship. Texas, Mississippi, and Georgia 
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continue to prominently stand out in relation to these four states (21, 7, and 5 comparable cases, 
respectively),70 but it is less clear as to whether there is a meaningful difference between the non-
covered states and Virginia or Arizona, for example. Continuing to monitor state behavior after 
preclearance is an important part of mapping which states are actually the biggest violators of 
voting rights, and which happened to be under more scrutiny and therefore punished more 
frequently. 
 
UNBURDENED OR UNLEASHED? 
State actions immediately after the Supreme Court decision in mid-2013 removed states from the 
preclearance requirement highlight why the burden of proof is such a powerful tool for 
policymaking and regulating efforts. In less than two years since the decision, seven of the ten 
formerly covered states have enacted state-level policies that would almost certainly be classified 
as restrictive in this study, that is to say objected to by the Attorney General. Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote for the majority in the Shelby County decision that, “things have changed 
dramatically” over the VRA’s 50 years, and “blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees 
are rare.”71 Beginning with fervor in 2011, but especially after the decision was read, states 
began to challenge the Court’s perception of the current conditions for electoral policymaking by 
passing restrictive policies that were not subject to preclearance and could not be objected to 
before enactment (See Table 6 below). Reaching back to 2011 is necessary to encapsulate this 
post-VRA era both because of the time necessary to review and challenge potentially restrictive 
policies and to reflect both sides of identical policymaking in some of the states that spanned the 
Supreme Court decision. 
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The most striking trend of the period since Shelby County is the frequency of states 
enacting procedural electoral policies. In this new wave of unbridled policymaking, the formerly 
covered states are showing a similar proclivity as counties and cities did under Section 5 in that 
they are borrowing policy initiatives from other like-minded areas. Six of the seven states that 
have acted in this recent period have instituted voter identification laws. Certainly these laws 
have been a central goal of conservative lawmakers nationwide, but it remains shocking that 
photo identification policies objected to due to their discriminatory effect in South Carolina and 
Texas could be reinstated in basically the same form after the Supreme Court decision. 
 
 
State Policies 
Alabama Photo ID law (2011) Documentary proof of citizenship (2011) 
Alaska None 
Arizona None 
Georgia Reduction in early voting (2011) 
Louisiana None 
Mississippi Photo ID law (2011) 
North Carolina 
Elimination of same-day registration (2013) 
Reduction in early voting (2013) 
Ended pre-registration for 16- and 17-year-olds (2013) 
Photo ID law (2013) 
South Carolina Photo ID law (2011) 
Texas 2011 Photo ID law re-enacted (2014) Restriction on voter registration drives (2013) 
Virginia Photo ID law (2013) Restriction to third-party voter registration (2013) 
Arkansas Photo ID law, subsequently struck down by state Supreme Court (2013) 
Delaware None 
Nevada None 
Tennessee 
Update to 2011 Photo ID law (2014) 
Reduction in early voting (2011) 
Documentary proof of citizenship (2011) 
Table 6: Recent Restrictive Policies of Formerly Covered States and Quasi-Control States 
Source: Brennan Center for Justice 	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Interestingly, the formerly covered states have shown a heavy preference for procedural 
and registration policies rather than following their favoring of districting and structural policies 
throughout the Section 5 era. Again, this reflects a nationwide partisan swell in support of 
restrictive policies, but remains notable nonetheless. While it is still too early to fully judge the 
aftermath of Shelby County, the immediate policy responses from many of the states – both 
formerly covered and not – indicates that Section 5 still held regulatory weight in the eyes of the 
states. After years of declining Section 5 objections, states seized at the opportunity to act 
unencumbered from soliciting the ruling of the federal government for each election policy. 
To illustrate this point, I will briefly assume that all of the policies enacted by formerly 
covered states would have been objected to had preclearance still applied. Of course, this groups 
in policies that were not objected to and some that have cleared judicial hurdles already. 
However, all of the policies are restrictive in the sense that they make it more difficult for 
people, often minorities, to cast a ballot and are therefore fair game for this comparison. In the 
five years surrounding the 2013 decision, 2010-2014, there were 32 restrictive policies either 
objected to by the Attorney General or enacted at the state level and included in the table above. 
The previous five-year period, 2005-2009, included only 11 policy objections. The jump in 
restrictive policies after a two-decade decline is most logically explained by the confluence of 
pervasive national trends and the deregulation of election policy by the Supreme Court. 
Two of the three formerly covered states that have not yet enacted restrictive election 
policies in the wake of Shelby County are Alaska and Arizona, which experienced the fewest 
objections in the Section 5 era out of all ten states. Acknowledging the still-too-small sample and 
the lack of data from cities and counties, perhaps these states are demonstrating a fundamental 
difference in the type of “learning” exhibited by formerly covered states. So far, these two states 
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fit in to the idea that the VRA and Section 5 was overdue for a change and that the states had 
learned their lesson. While this theory is largely disproven by the actions of the majority of the 
states, it should not be completely cast aside. Originally covered due to the presence of language 
minorities, and not expressly tied to race, there may be a persistence in restrictive policies that 
has carried forward with race, but is not matched by language-based coverage. Further study 
about why Alaska and Arizona have resisted the path of the other states throughout history and 
now may help inform the conversation about the future of a new coverage formula more tightly 
aimed at the states and localities that continually generate electorally restrictive policies. 
Over the past five years, two of the quasi-control states have tried to install more 
restrictive policies, mirroring the majority of the formerly covered states. Arkansas’ 2013 photo 
identification law, another example of a procedural policy, reached the state’s Supreme Court 
before being struck down. Tennessee lawmakers succeeded where Arkansas’ did not, however. 
The never-covered state enacted three restrictive policies dealing with registration and voting 
procedures in 2011, none of which were subject to preclearance, of course. After the Shelby 
County decision, Tennessee doubled down on its restrictive policies by updating its photo 
identification law. As these two states serve as analogues for the seven southern states in the 
analysis plus Texas, which all but one (Louisiana) have enacted restrictive policies, it appears as 
though the recent policymaking action transcends the immediate reaction to being set free from 
Section 5 as discussed above. Since some of the never-covered states also chose this moment in 
time to enact restrictive policies, this suggests that there was a national trend at play. To reiterate 
the conclusion from above, the end of preclearance and the national policy climate reinforced 
one another to bring about this upturn in restrictive policies. 
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The other two quasi-control states, Delaware and Nevada, have not passed new restrictive 
policies in the past five years. Despite the small sample size, this result fits in well with the idea 
that the southern states were much more quick to act. While Delaware closely resembles Virginia 
and North Carolina in black population and prejudice score,72 its government has been far more 
liberal over the last five years, and therefore less likely to endorse the restrictive policies 
examined here.73 As for the language-minority states, Nevada closely reflects Arizona in terms 
of Hispanic population, prejudice ranking, and lack of restrictive policies in the past few years.74 
While this may be no more than a coincidence, Nevada fits well into the emerging model of 
studied states that have not enacted restrictive policies – non-southern and relatively less 
conservative. 
It very well may still be too early to tell how states and especially how localities will 
respond to their newfound autonomy in election policy. Initially, most formerly covered states 
appear to have been unleashed from their policymaking restraints and have responded with 
restrictive policies, some of which mirror policies that have been objected to in the past. Still, a 
few of the formerly covered states have not rushed to act, but have surely been unburdened in 
their passage of regular, nondiscriminatory election policies. If this divide persists, it will be a 
key aspect of the discussion about a reformed VRA Section 4b formula, which could reinstate 
the Section 5 preclearance provision in certain areas. 
 
Reconsideration and Reform: The Future of Section 5 
Moving into a new reality devoid of Section 5’s protections against electorally restrictive 
policies sharply reconfigures the playing field between state policy interests and federal 
regulation. Section 2 of the VRA still is intact, carrying many of the same protections as Section 
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5, but lacking its proactive power. Without preclearance, the burden of proof shifts to the federal 
government and individuals in the assessment of whether a state or local policy violates the 
protections of the VRA. Although the Department of Justice can and has filed federal suits 
against states under Section 2 of the VRA, the process is much less efficient and more drawn out 
than exercising preclearance. Effectively placing the hurdle of proving discrimination higher in 
the formerly covered states, this approach has already proven to be abused by the numerous 
policies originating in the formerly covered states in the past two years post-Shelby County. 
While these new restrictive policies navigate through the protracted judicial process, elections 
may take place with minority populations facing unfair disadvantages affecting their electoral 
influence. The Supreme Court explicitly left open the possibility of Congress rewriting a 
coverage formula, which would reactivate Section 5. Drawing from the policy histories traced 
throughout this analysis, a reconstructed VRA directing preclearance at the states and localities 
most in need of federal regulation remains possible. 
 In January 2014, Congress put forth the Voting Rights Amendment Act, a bill that 
attempted to restore preclearance to jurisdictions that have committed five or more “voting rights 
violations” in the past fifteen years, or have extremely low minority voter turnout.75 Despite 
being cosponsored by 177 Members of Congress, including 166 Democrats and 11 Republicans, 
the bill was buried in the Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice in mid-March, 
2014.76 Given the partisan reality hindering legislation of an updated VRA, the topic would 
benefit from additional research to better instruct the next iteration of a congressional VRA fix. 
 Throughout this research, the seemingly inescapable issue of partisanship intruded as a 
central factor in assessing restrictive electoral policies, despite my effort to avoid it wherever 
possible. While the Section 5 coverage period from 1965 to 2013 did not seem to directly vary 
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based on the party of the President and accordingly the Attorney General, it is not difficult to 
imagine a significantly different set of standards used to judge which policies constituted a 
discriminatory effect based on who occupied the White house at the time. Tracking the 
objections by Attorney General or by President may give greater insight into the historical 
foundations of the current partisan divide, especially with respect to the difference of opinions 
about the most high profile procedural policies such as voter identification and early voting. 
 Another beneficial avenue for future research is exploring the question of universal 
preclearance. Proposed and promoted by Aarons and Trahan-Liptak among others, this blanket 
coverage would prevent restrictive policies and equally affect each state and jurisdiction. 
Navigating through the Constitutional ambiguities and choosing the necessarily precise language 
for a new VRA amendment expanding preclearance would be a challenging, yet potentially 
revolutionizing next step in VRA scholarship. 
 In endeavoring to sketch the policy history of Section 5 of the VRA over the past fifty 
years, it has become apparent that the formerly covered states and localities created restrictive 
electoral policies within a context shaped by discrimination, the actions of neighboring 
jurisdictions, and partisan priorities. There may be a fewer number of total policies in need of 
objection today, thankfully, but these core factors continue to drive state and local policies. 
Accordingly, patterns develop around the beginning of decades due to redistricting, and trends 
emerge with the type of policies, i.e. districting and structural policies from the Section 5 era 
giving way to procedural and registration policies today. Some commentators treated the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Shelby County as if it was the kiss of death to any future for 
preclearance. State actions over the subsequent two years have reminded us of the crucial need 
for a regulatory review process to keep discriminatory state ambition in check, however. The 
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demands for a fair and representative government along with equal access to the polls remain 
imperative, and should form the basis of the guiding principles in the continuing effort to 
understand and to improve the Voting Rights Act. 
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Appendix 1. Full State Demographic and Ideological Data 
State by State Demographic  
and Ideological Data 
Black Population Prejudice Rank 
Alabama 26.5% 4 
Georgia 31.2% 5 
Louisiana 32.4% 1 
Mississippi 37.4% 2 
North Carolina 22.0% 10 
South Carolina 28.0% 7 
Virginia 19.7% 19 
Average 28.2% 6.9 
Arkansas 15.6% 6 
Delaware 22.0% 12 
Tennessee 17.0% 13 
U.S. Average 13.1% - 
   
 Hispanic (*Indigenous) Population Prejudice Rank 
Alaska* 14.8% 40 
Arizona 30.2% 43 
Texas 38.2% 3 
Average (Hispanic) 34.2% 28.7 
Nevada 27.3% 42 
U.S. Average 16.9% (*1.2%) - 
Sources: US Census Bureau, 2010; Election Law Blog 
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